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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyzes the accounting choices of firms in periods surrounding large work-force 
reductions (layoffs). Layoffs provide an incentive for managers to use accounting choices to 
manage earnings. Accrual analysis is performed on a sample of firms that announce large layoffs. 
Discretionary accruals are regressed on indicator variables for years associated with large layoffs. 
The results indicate that firms make accounting choices to reduce reported income in the years in 
which they announce large layoffs.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
his paper analyzes accounting choices of firms in periods surrounding large workforce reductions 
(layoffs). Prior research finds that managers make accounting choices in predictable ways. Accounting 
choices are shown to be systematically affected by both firm contracts that are explicitly tied to 
accounting numbers, e.g., debt contract provisions and by situations only implicitly related to reported accounting 
numbers, e.g. political costs.
1
  Theories in the literature propose a general tendency to smooth earnings, and when 
earnings are too low to be smoothed, a tendency to understate earnings to enable future income smoothing.
2
 
 
 We argue that in periods of large layoffs managers have the incentive to use accounting choices to manage 
earnings. When the layoffs are a result of negative earnings that are large enough that firms are unable to report 
favorable results, managing accounting choices to reduce earnings in the current period clears the decks to allow 
favorable earnings reports in the future. In addition, the negative impact of layoffs on morale of remaining employees 
is dampened if the firm can demonstrate the need for layoffs (i.e., send the message that the company cares about the 
employees, but because of financial circumstances had no choice but to reduce the work force) and can report 
improved earnings subsequently to allay fears of further layoffs. Understanding the accounting behavior of firms 
surrounding large layoffs will help users better understand the financial statements of firms surrounding 
announcements of those layoffs. 
 
 Accrual analysis, similar to that of Jones (1991), and Cahan (1992) is performed on a sample of firms that 
announced large layoffs. Total accruals, and the components of total accruals, are regressed on two economic factors 
and an indicator variable for years associated with large layoffs using a two-way fixed effects covariance model that 
controls for both year and firm. Our findings indicate that firms reduce reported income with negative discretionary 
accruals in years in which they announce large layoffs. 
 
 The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section develops a relationship between work 
force reductions and accounting choices. The following sections describe the research design, the sample selection, the 
research methods, the results, the conclusions, and suggestions for future research. 
 
 
 
 
T 
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WORK FORCE REDUCTION AND ACCOUNTING CHOICES 
 
 This paper investigates the hypothesis that firms manage accruals to reduce earnings in periods surrounding 
significant corporate layoffs. Evidence indicates that firms smooth income to report favorable earnings from period to 
period. However, when poor performance precludes reporting favorable results, firms use accounting discretion to 
reduce earnings enabling smoothing to resume in future periods. Such behavior is predicted by two different 
hypotheses existing in the literature.
3
  The bonus plan hypothesis predicts that when earnings are below the lower 
bound of the bonus scheme managers will reduce income to save earnings for future periods when they can be used to 
increase management bonuses. The ―big bath‖ hypothesis posits that firms reduce earnings in periods of poor 
performance to ―clear the decks‖ for better earnings reports in future periods. Since large layoffs are normally 
associated with poor earnings performance, we expect firms announcing large layoffs to make income-decreasing 
accruals. This study is not intended as a test of either of the two hypotheses described above, nor is it intended as a test 
to differentiate between the hypotheses. It is intended as a descriptive study to better clarify accounting behavior 
during period of the significant event of layoffs. 
 
 Income-decreasing accruals may also have a positive effect on a firm’s workforce since income-decreasing 
accruals in the current period results in income-increasing reversals in succeeding periods. Employees that remain with 
the firm suffer from downsizing. Among the various negative effects, downsizing causes anxiety prompting undesired 
employee turnover (Cameron et al. 1987) and decline-induced stress causing interpersonal and inter-unit conflicts 
(Whetten 1980). Workers who remain often experience feelings of depression, mistrust, betrayal, guilt, pain, 
loneliness, and job insecurity (Caudron 1996). There is also an increased tendency towards gossip (Wensky 1993) and 
fear of the future (Whigham-Desir 1993).  
 
 Decreasing reported earnings in the year of the layoff can alleviate much of the negative effect on remaining 
employees. Evidence from the literature in organizational justice indicates that employees are more likely to accept 
bad news if the reasons behind the decision are explained to them and the process seems fair.
4
  Making the layoffs 
seem more necessary than would premanaged earnings helps the layoffs seem fairer, alleviating feelings of mistrust 
and betrayal (Caudron 1996). The reversal of the accruals in future periods, increases income in those periods making 
workers feel more secure and alleviating anxiety and fear of the future.
5
  
 
 On the other hand, manipulating accruals to report lower earnings may be costly to the firm in that lower 
earnings may decrease the share price. Research indicates that layoff announcements are generally preceded by a 
period of poor earnings performance, are accompanied by a negative stock price reaction, and followed by improved 
earnings and price performance (e.g., Chen et al. 2001). Given that both the poor prior earnings performance and the 
layoff announcement provide negative signals to the stock market, we suspect the marginal impact on stock prices of 
downward accrual manipulation to be small.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Dechow et al. (1995) evaluate the ability of alternative accrual models to detect earnings management. They 
conclude that a modified version of the model developed by Jones (1991) provides the most powerful test of earnings 
management. We use a form of the modified Jones model to measure discretionary accruals in this study. The model 
regresses total accruals on the change in sales and the fixed asset balance. The modified Jones model includes a 
control for the potential manipulation of sales revenue in the test period. The modified Jones model uses the change in 
reported sales revenue, SALES, less any change in accounts receivable as the explanatory variable in periods 
theorized to include manipulation (Dechow et al. 1995).
 6
   The portion of total accruals not explained by this set of 
explanatory variables is our estimate of discretionary accruals. The basic accrual model is:  
 
A b b SALES b FA eit it it it   0 1 2                     (1) 
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where: 
Ait  = total accruals (deflated by lagged total assets) for firm i in year t, 
SALESit = change in sales (deflated by lagged total assets) for firm i from year t-1 to year t, during 
non-event periods (periods in which earnings management is not hypothesized), and change 
in sales for firm i from year t-1 to year t less the change in receivables balance for firm i 
from year t-1 to year t (all deflated by total assets) during event periods (periods in which 
earnings management is hypothesized); and 
FAit = balance of fixed assets (deflated by lagged total assets) at the end of year t for firm i. 
 
To test for accrual manipulation, we expand model (1) to include indicator variables to detect the effect of 
announcements of large layoffs on discretionary accruals. 
 
 Dechow et al. (1995) also demonstrate that for firms with extremely poor performance, discretionary 
accruals, as measured by the Jones model, are significantly negative without considering any specific stimulus. Since 
the event of large layoffs is reasonably expected to be correlated with poor earnings performance, the results of our 
tests using the Jones model are biased in favor of rejecting the null hypothesis of no accrual management. We control 
for this effect by including an earnings performance measure in the regression, as recommended by Dechow et al 
(1995).  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
Sample 
 
We searched the Wall Street Journal Index for the twenty-year period 1976-1995 for reports of firms that had 
lain off a significant number of employees.
7
  To be considered for the sample, we required that the firm have a 
minimum of eight years of data available on Compustat, that those years encompass the year of the layoff 
announcement, and that the announced layoff represent a minimum of one percent of the firm’s workforce.8 We also 
required, for each firm, that the first announced layoff in the test period be preceded by two years in which no layoffs 
were announced. These procedures yielded 518 announcements affecting 367 firms. Data are pooled yielding a final 
sample 6,303 firm-years. Table 1 reports layoff events by year. 
 
Method 
 
 We use three alternative measures of total accruals, a traditional individual components measure of accruals, 
hereinafter components accruals, and two measures based on the difference between operating cash flows and 
earnings, hereinafter cash-flow accruals. Total accruals using the components approach is calculated for each firm year 
as follows: 
 
1
)()()()(
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where 
DEPit = depreciation expense for firm i in year t; 
ARit = the change in accounts receivable balance from year t-1 to year t for firm i; 
INVit = the change in inventory balance from year t-1 to year t for firm i; 
APit = the change in accounts payable balance from year t-1 to year t for firm i; 
TPit = the change in taxes payable balance from year t-1 to year t for firm i; 
DTit = deferred tax expense for firm i in year t; and 
TAit = total asset balance for firm i at the end of year t.  
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Total accruals using the cash-flow approach is calculated as either: 
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where 
IBit = Income before discontinued operations and extraordinary items for firm i in year t;  
NIit = net income for firm i in year t; and  
OCFit = operating cash flow for firm i in year t. 
 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Year 
Total Number of Firms 
in Sample 
Number of Firms 
Announcing Layoffs Average Total Assets 
Average Total Assets of 
Layoff Firms 
1977 286 28 3,757 1,902 
1978 287 16 4,248 1,610 
1979 289 2 4,881 21,623 
1980 290 2 5,446 4,952 
1981 293 5 5,946 2,123 
1982 293 16 6,681 2,304 
1983 319 6 7,043 4,288 
1984 334 2 7,142 42,837 
1985 344 0 8,246 —— 
1986 353 4 8,881 14,472 
1987 362 0 9,939 —— 
1988 368 2 11,016 85,113 
1989 366 5 12,151 50,394 
1990 366 57 13,082 19,956 
1991 364 88 13,827 20,534 
1992 365 98 14,398 14,896 
1993 362 92 15,209 15,168 
1994 358 95 16,455 15,464 
1995 304 0 19,613 —— 
Firm/yrs 6,303 518   
Average Total Assets – Average totals assts for all sample firms for that sample year. 
Average Total Assts of Layoff Firms – Average totals assts for layoff firms for that sample year. 
 
 
Both the components and cash flow measures of accruals have important advantages and taken together 
present a more complete picture of accrual behavior than either can do taken alone. Hibrar and Collins (2002) 
document that the components measure of accruals should not be used for firms engaged in merger activity, with 
significant discontinued operations, or with significant foreign currency translations. Firms with significant 
discontinued operations or write-offs in the event year, as firms with large layoffs are likely to have, measure accruals 
for the entire firm in the prior year and accruals of a reduced firm in the event year, producing biased results. The cash 
flow measure of accruals avoids this bias. 
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On the other hand, using the cash-flow measure has important weaknesses. In focusing on management of 
accruals surrounding large layoffs, we are interested in the hidden accruals in normal accounts. The cash-flow measure 
of accruals includes all differences between earnings and cash flow from operations and thus those explicitly reported 
non-recurring charges (e.g., severance costs), write-downs, and restructuring charges associated with large layoffs. 
While these non-recurring charges may represent legitimate abnormal accruals taken in the normal course of a layoff, 
we posit that accruals in normal business accounts that are unexplained by model (1) during the layoff periods more 
accurately represent accrual manipulation. 
 
 The SFAS 95 cash flow from operations information required to calculate total accruals using the cash flow 
approach is available for only the last eight years of our sample period. Using this measure eliminates approximately 
half of our sample firm/years. Retaining sufficient sample size to run the model on smaller subsets of data would 
require relaxing the requirement of having eight years of data for each firm in the model. Decreasing the number of 
years decreases the stability of the model.  
 
 Using the components measure of total accruals allows us to better focus on hidden accruals, estimate with 
larger sample sizes and with more estimation years per firm. Furthermore, using the components measure allows us to 
examine the individual components of accruals to determine which of those accounts is actually being managed and 
come to a better understanding of the detailed nature of accrual manipulation surrounding large layoffs. The problem 
of bias due to mergers, significant discontinued operations, foreign currency translations, and one-time write-offs is 
controlled by eliminating firms that report these items. Thus, our tests are conducted on four different samples. The 
Full Sample includes all sample firms. The Clean Sample excludes all firms reporting mergers, discontinued 
operations, and foreign currency transactions in the event period. The Clean NSPI sample excludes both the firms 
reporting mergers, discontinued operations, and foreign currency transactions and firms reporting special items (as 
defined by Compustat) during the event period. The Cash Flow sample includes only those firms for which operating 
cash flow information was available. Table 2 contains descriptive information for each of the four samples. 
 
 Model (1) is expanded to include variables to test the effect of announcements of large work force reductions 
on discretionary accruals. LAYOFF is a dichotomous variable set equal to one for years in which the firm announced 
large layoffs and zero in other years. We expect that in years when LAYOFF is equal to one, firms will make income-
decreasing discretionary accruals. If firms plan and anticipate layoffs, accrual manipulation may begin in the period 
prior to the announcement. LAYOFFM1 is a dichotomous variable set equal to one in the year immediately prior to the 
year of an announcement of large layoffs provided there was no additional announcement in the two preceding years.
9
 
LOSS is a dichotomous variable set equal to one in the years in which the firm reported a loss and zero in other years. 
LOSS is included to control for the negative accrual bias of firms reporting extreme poor earnings performance as 
documented by Dechow et al. (1995). The effect of large layoff announcements is tested by estimating model (5): 
 
itititititititit
eLOSSbLAYOFFMbLAYOFFbFAbSALESbbA 
543210
1                (5) 
 
where: 
Ait, SALESit, and FAit are defined as above, 
 LAYOFFit = 1 in year firm i announced layoffs, 0 otherwise, 
 LAYOFFM1it  = 1 in year prior to announcement of layoffs by firm i, 0 otherwise, and 
LOSSit   = 1 in year firm i reported net loss, 0 otherwise.  
 
The expected sign of the SALES coefficient is positive. The expected signs for the FA, LAYOFF, LAYOFFM1, and 
LOSS are all negative. Model (5) is estimated using the fixed effects covariance model described by Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld (1981, 254-255) and used by Cahan (1992). The fixed effects estimation results in a firm/year specific 
intercept, b0it. 
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics by Sample 
 
 
Sample 
 
# of firms # of jobs. 
# of observations per firm 
Percent 
event year 
observations 
Total Assets 
($ millions) 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Full 367 6,303 17 19 8.2 10,150 2,032 
Clean 195 2,732 14 14 8.6 7,661 1,530 
Clean NSPI 108 1,344 12 12 5.4 8,486 1,710 
Cash Flow 327 2,517 8 8 15.9 10,018 2,368 
 
Sample 
Total Sales Revenue 
($ millions) 
Total Accruals-components 
($ millions) 
Net Income 
($ millions) 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Full 5,812 1,891 (165) (41) 237 63 
Clean 4,173 1,371 (74) (35) 187 48 
Clean NSPI 4,136 1,375 (43) (23) 248 70 
Cash Flow 7,354 2,147 (140) (57) 246 56 
Sample 
Income From Continuing 
Operations ($ millions) 
 
Deflated Net Income* 
Deflated Income from Continuing 
Operations 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Full 253 65 0.0301 0.0445 0.0311 0.0443 
Clean 202 49 0.0287 0.0444 0.0274 0.0443 
Clean NSPI 258 72 0.0510 0.0503 0.0510 0.0499 
Cash Flow 288 66 0.0148 0.0353 0.0147 0.0364 
Sample 
Deflated Total Accruals (based on 
the total accruals as defined by 
model (2) 
Deflated Total Accruals (based on 
net income less operating cash 
flows) 
Deflated Total Accruals (based on 
income from continuing 
operations less operating cash 
flows) 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Full -0.0348 -0.0373     
Clean -0.0345 -0.0387     
Clean NSPI -0.0227 -0.0288     
Cash Flow -0.0440 -0.0437 -0.0668 -0.0558 -0.0667 -0.0563 
* All deflated variables are deflated by total assets. 
 
Samples: Full – Full pooled sample over all available years for the 367 sample firms. 
Clean – Full pooled sample less firm years that include mergers, discontinued operations, and/or foreign currency 
translations. 
Clean NSPI – Clean sample less firm years that include special income items.  
Cash Flow – Full sample firm years that include SFAS 95 operating cash flow information. 
 
TESTS AND RESULTS 
 
 Results column (1) of Table 3 reports the results of the fixed effects covariance estimation of model (5) on 
our full sample using the components measure of total accruals. Both SALES and FA are statistically significant as 
predicted. The F statistic for the model is significant at the 0.0001 level. R
2
 is 41 percent. These results are similar to 
those of prior studies and support the notion that the change in sales and the level of fixed assets explain a significant 
portion of total accruals.
10
  LAYOFF is significant at the 0.02 level when the LOSS variable is not included and at 
0.07 when it is included, indicating that firms take steps to reduce income through the use of discretionary accruals in 
years of large-layoff announcements. The LAYOFF coefficient of -0.0083 indicates that, on average, discretionary 
accruals reduced reported income by 0.83% of total assets in the layoff announcement years. This amount corresponds 
to a 36.1% understatement of average return on assets or an $84 million dollar understatement of income by an 
average size firm.
11
  LAYOFFM1 is not statistically significant. There is no indication from these results that firms 
manage earnings in the year prior to the year of layoff announcement.  
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Table 3:  Model (3) Regression Results/Full Sample and Cash Flow Sample 
 
 
  
 
Results Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Accrual 
Measure  Components Components ACO ANI 
Sample  Full Cash Flow Cash Flow Cash Flow 
Independ. 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Estimate 
t-statistic 
one-tailed probability 
Intercept  -0.0859 -0.0849 -0.2129 -0.2098 0.8395 0.8514 0.7522 0.7641 
  -0.9800 -0.9700 -0.6200 -0.6200 2.0700 2.2000 1.4200 1.4800 
  0.1870 0.1664 0.2671 0.2693 0.0194 0.0141 0.0784 0.0699 
∆SALES + 0.1573 0.1507 0.1693 0.1614 0.1362 0.1061 0.1535 0.1235 
  31.6100 29.6300 20.4800 19.1500 13.9000 11.0800 11.9800 9.6700 
  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
FA - -0.1308 -0.1280 -0.1155 -0.1062 -0.1306 -0.0953 -0.1668 -0.1316 
  -10.0900 -9.9000 -4.1500 -3.8200 -3.9600 -3.0200 -3.8600 -3.1200 
  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0013 0.0001 0.0009 
LAYOFF - -0.0083 -0.0060 -0.0097 -0.0065 -0.0261 -0.0141 -0.2309 -0.0111 
  -2.0300 -1.4500 -1.9200 -1.2800 -4.3500 -2.4200 -2.9400 -1.4300 
  0.0214 0.0735 0.0113 0.1000 0.0001 0.0078 0.0017 0.0760 
LAYOFFM1 - 0.0007 0.0028 -0.0019 0.0008 -0.0134 -0.0030 -0.0189 -0.0086 
  0.1500 0.6000 -0.3500 0.1500 -2.0600 -0.4900 -2.2300 -1.0300 
  0.5610 0.7256 0.3632 0.5581 0.0196 0.3128 0.0130 0.1510 
LOSS -  -0.0197  -0.0217  -0.0826  -0.0822 
   -5.8400  -4.3500  -14.5900  -10.8800 
   0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001 
N  6,303 6,303 2,517 2,517 2,517 2,517 2,517 2,517 
R2  0.4148 0.4181 0.5184 0.5226 0.5377 0.5788 0.4042 0.4349 
Adjusted R2 0.3740 0.3775 0.4440 0.4485 0.4663 0.5135 0.3221 0.3473 
F  10.1900 10.3000 6.9600 7.0600 7.5200 8.8600 4.3900 4.9600 
Prob. F  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
A*           - Total accrual measure.      
Components - Total accruals as defined by model (2).      
ACO      - Total accruals equal to earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations  
                             less operating cash flows.       
ANI - Total accruals equal to net income less operating cash flows.    
∆SALES - Change in sales.        
FA - Fixed assets.        
LAYOFF - Equal to one if layoff year, zero otherwise.     
LAYOFFM1 - Equal to one if year before layoff year, zero otherwise.    
LOSS  - Equal to one if earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations is less than zero, zero 
otherwise. 
*All variables are deflated by total assets.       
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 Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 present the results of tests using the cash flow measure of total accruals. 
Notice that the sample size is reduced by more than one-half when firm-years without cash-flow information are 
deleted from the sample. Column (2) reports results of using the components measure with the reduced sample for 
comparison purposes. SALES and FA remain significant as predicted. Results for LAYOFFS is notably stronger in 
columns (3) and (4) than in columns (1) and (2). We believe this is because of the inclusion of those explicitly reported 
nonrecurring charges that are not contained in one of the six components of total accruals, as was noted above.  
 
 Hibrar and Collins (2002) document that the components measure of accruals is inappropriate for firms 
engaged in mergers, for firms with significant discontinued operations, and for firms with significant foreign currency 
translations. This concern is addressed in the clean sample results reported in column (1) of Table 4. The clean sample 
does not include any firm years that included merger activities or any firm years that had either significant 
discontinued operations or foreign currency translations, using the Hibrar and Collins (2002) cutoffs.
12
  The results are 
similar to those in Table 3.  
 
The additional concern that the results reflect one-time write-offs in the layoff years is addressed in column 
(2) of Table 4 by removing all firm years that included special items as defined by Compustat item SPI. This reduced 
sample is referred to as our clean NSPI sample. Results are similar to those reported in Table 3.  
 
To better visualize the effect of layoff events, we exclude LAYOFF and LAYOFFM1 from the components 
accrual version of model (5) and calculate the residuals in the following model: 
 
ititititit eLOSSbFAbSALESbbA  3210                      (6) 
 
Net income is scaled by total assets and adjusted using these residuals to get an estimate of deflated pre-managed 
income. Then, these deflated measures of net income and pre-managed income are plotted with respect to event years 
in Figure 1. Figure 1 includes the averages for three years prior to the first layoff year, and for three years after the last 
layoff year. Panel A represents results using the full sample of 6,303 firm-years, and panel B represents results using 
the clean NSPI sample of 1,344 firm-years. The first layoff year is the year of a layoff preceded by at least two years 
with no layoff announcements. The last layoff year is the year of a layoff immediately succeeded by two years with no 
layoff announcements. (The first and last layoff years are often the same year.)  There is a marked decline in 
discretionary accruals in the first layoff year in both samples and a marked increase in year +2 in the full sample and 
year +3 in the clean NSPI sample.  
 
 To better understand the nature of accrual management in periods surrounding the event of large layoffs we 
estimate our model using the individual components of accruals as the dependent variable. Hall and Stammerjohan 
(1997) found markedly different results estimating working-capital versus nonworking-capital accruals. Table 5 
reports results of the fixed effects covariance estimations of model (5) with the six individual components of accruals 
alternately used as the dependent variable. The estimations are run on the full and clean NSPI samples. If reported 
income is reduced through the manipulation of accruals in normal business accounts, such as current asset and liability 
accounts, we would expect LAYOFFS to be a significant predictor of the reported changes unexplained by model (1) 
in the layoff announcement periods.  
 
Estimations reported in Table 5 indicate that five of the six components models are estimated with overall 
significance at the 0.0001 level. Only the TP model failed to be significant at conventional levels. The adjusted R
2
s 
on the significant models ranged from 0.13 to 0.93. As would be expected, SALES was a significant predictor of 
changes in both current assets and current liabilities. Increases in sales correspond to both larger debit balances in 
accounts receivable and inventory and larger credit balances in accounts payable. Also, as expected, the level of fixed 
assets is a significant predictor of depreciation expense. 
 
 
 
Journal of Applied Business Research – Fall 2005                                                                      Volume 21, Number 4 
 31 
Table 4:  Model (3) Regression Results/Clean and Clean NSPI Samples 
 
 
Result columns  (1) (2) 
Accrual measure  Components Components 
Sample  Clean Clean NSPI 
Independent 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Estimate 
t-statistic 
one-tailed probability 
Intercept  0.0963 0.1016 0.1301 0.1452 
  0.8500 0.8900 0.67 0.75 
  0.1991 0.1856 0.5039 0.4553 
∆SALES + 0.1263 0.1176 0.0889 0.0844 
  14.1000 12.8300 6.42 6.05 
  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
FA - -0.1493 -0.1424 -0.1292 -0.1215 
  -7.2500 -6.9200 -3.84 -3.60 
  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 
LAYOFF - -0.0114 -0.0090 -0.0181 -0.0178 
  -1.7100 -1.3500 -1.71 -1.68 
  0.0437 0.0890 0.0438 0.0467 
LAYOFFM1 - -0.0047 -0.0014 0.0063 0.0071 
  -0.6100 -0.1800 0.52 0.58 
  0.2696 0.4280 0.6968 0.7202 
LOSS -  -0.0235  -0.0252 
   -4.1900  -2.32 
   0.0001  0.0102 
N  2,732 2,732 1,344 1,344 
R2  0.3831 0.3874 0.390 0.393 
Adjusted R2 0.3261 0.3305 0.320 0.323 
F 6.7200 6.8100 5.59 5.61 
Prob. F 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
A*           - Total accruals measure.  
Components      - Total accruals as defined by model (2). 
∆SALES - Change in sales.        
FA - Fixed assets.        
LAYOFF - Equal to one if layoff year, zero otherwise.     
LAYOFFM1 - Equal to one if year before layoff year, zero otherwise.    
LOSS  - Equal to one if earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations is less than zero, zero 
otherwise. 
*All variables are deflated by total assets.       
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Figure 1 – Panel A:  Full Sample 
Income and Discretionary Accruals 
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Figure 1 – Panel B:  Clean NSPI Sample 
Income and Discretionary Accruals 
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The LAYOFF coefficient is significant and in the predicted direction in several of the estimations. LAYOFF 
is significant (p≤0.0377) in the AR model in the clean/no special items sample.13 Accounts receivable are decreased 
more than can be explained by the change in sales and by negative earnings performance, indicating that firms may 
delay the reporting of revenue to decrease earnings. LAYOFF is significant (p≤0.0007) in the INV model for all 
estimations, indicating that inventory levels are lower in layoff years than can be explained by change in sales and 
negative earnings performance. However, we would expect layoffs to be associated with excess inventories, so this 
effect might be expected in the absence of any earnings manipulation as firms reduce excess inventories. Thus, these 
results alone are not conclusive, but when taken together with the other results, they are consistent with accrual 
manipulation. 
 
 
Journal of Applied Business Research – Fall 2005                                                                      Volume 21, Number 4 
 33 
Table 5 - Panel A:  Model (4) Regression Results/Full and Clean NSPI Samples 
 
 
                     
Dependent 
Variable ∆AR ∆INV 
Sample   Full Clean NSPI   Full Clean NSPI 
Independent 
Variable 
Exp. 
Sign     
Exp. 
Sign     
Intercept  -0.0632 -0.0623 0.1299 0.1381  -0.0735 -0.0729 -0.1545 -0.1437 
  -0.99 -0.98 1.08 1.15  -1.50 -1.49 -1.51 -1.41 
  0.3229 0.3276 0.2817 0.2522  0.1339 0.1357 0.1318 0.1597 
           
∆SALES + 0.1150 0.1088 0.0789 0.0765 + 0.1111 0.1076 0.0534 0.0502 
  31.79 29.49 9.20 8.84  40.08 37.96 7.33 6.85 
  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
           
FA ? -0.0406 -0.0380 -0.0433 -0.0391 ? -0.0111 -0.0096 -0.0264 -0.0209 
  -4.31 -4.05 -2.08 -1.87  -1.53 -1.33 -1.49 -1.18 
  0.0001 0.0001 0.0380 0.0617  0.1254 0.1832 0.1360 0.2383 
           
LAYOFF - -0.0046 -0.0025 -0.0119 -0.0117 - -0.0086 -0.0073 -0.0192 -0.0190 
  -1.55 -0.82 -1.81 -1.78  -3.75 -3.20 -3.45 -3.41 
  0.0601 0.2066 0.0355 0.0377  0.0001 0.0007 0.0003 0.0004 
           
LAYOFFM1 - -0.0005 0.0014 -0.0098 -0.0093 - 0.0024 0.0035 0.0077 0.0083 
  -0.15 0.42 -1.29 -1.23  0.91 1.34 1.20 1.30 
  0.4403 0.6640 0.0986 0.1090  0.8183 0.9093 0.8847 0.9023 
           
LOSS -  -0.0184  -0.0136 -  -0.0106  -0.0181 
   -7.51  -2.03   -5.60  -3.17 
   0.0001  0.0215   0.0001  0.0008 
           
N  6,303 6,303 1,344 1,344  6.303 6,303 1,344 1,344 
R2  0.345 0.351 0.445 0.447  0.349 0.353 0.393 0.398 
Adjusted R2 0.300 0.306 0.381 0.383  0.304 0.307 0.323 0.328 
F  7.58 7.77 7.00 7.00  7.71 7.81 5.65 5.72 
Prob. F  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
ACOMP* - Component of total accruals.       
∆AR - Change in accounts receivable.       
∆INV - Change in inventory.        
∆SALES - Change in sales.        
FA - Fixed assets.         
LAYOFF - Equal to one if layoff year, zero otherwise.      
LAYOFFM1 - Equal to one if year before layoff year, zero otherwise.    
LOSS  - Equal to one if earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations is less than zero, zero 
otherwise. 
*All variables are deflated by total assets.       
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Table 5 - Panel B:  Model (4) Regression Results/Full and Clean NSPI Samples 
 
 
  
 
    
  
              
Dependent 
Variable ∆AP ∆TP 
Sample   Full Clean NSPI   Full Clean NSPI 
Independent 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign     
Expected 
Sign     
Intercept  -0.1089 -0.1088 -0.1452 -0.1405  0.0657 0.0658 0.0016 0.0007 
  -2.50 -2.49 -1.17 -1.13  3.86 3.86 0.04 0.02 
  0.0126 0.0127 0.2433 0.2591  0.0001 0.0001 0.9655 0.9850 
           
∆SALES + 0.0633 0.0624 0.0284 0.0270 + 0.0091 0.0085 0.0119 0.0122 
  25.63 24.63 3.20 3.02  9.41 8.62 4.54 4.60 
  0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.0013  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
           
FA ? -0.0028 -0.0024 -0.0012 -0.0013 ? -0.0105 -0.0103 -0.0094 -0.0099 
  -0.44 -0.37 -0.05 -0.06  -4.18 -4.09 -1.48 -1.54 
  0.6622 0.7077 0.9598 0.9518  0.0001 0.0001 0.1400 0.1235 
           
LAYOFF + -0.0051 -0.0048 -0.0127 -0.0126 + -0.0000 0.0002 0.0009 0.0008 
  -2.51 -2.32 -1.87 -1.85  -0.06 0.19 0.43 0.42 
  0.9938 0.9899 0.9691 0.9679  0.5229 0.4244 0.3351 0.3390 
           
LAYOFFM1 + 0.0008 0.0011 -0.0093 -0.0090 + -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
  0.35 0.48 -1.19 -1.15  -0.46 -0.27 -0.07 -0.09 
  0.3643 0.3172 0.8823 0.8756  0.6780 0.6055 0.5276 0.5361 
           
LOSS +  -0.0029  -0.0079 -  -0.0017  0.0015 
   -1.69  1.13   -2.53  0.73 
   0.9547  0.8705   0.0057  0.7684 
           
N  6,303 6,303 1,344 1,344  6,303 6,303 1,344 1,344 
R2  0.324 0.324 0.323 0.324  0.068 0.069 0.082 0.083 
Adjusted R2 0.277 0.277 0.246 0.246  0.003 0.004 -0.023 -0.023 
F  6.89 6.88 4.17 4.15  1.05 1.06 0.78 0.78 
Prob. F  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001  0.2467 0.1915 0.9673 0.9692 
ACOMP* - Component of total accruals.       
∆AP - Change in accounts payable.       
∆TP - Change in taxes payable.       
∆SALES - Change in sales.        
FA - Fixed assets.         
LAYOFF - Equal to one if layoff year, zero otherwise.      
LAYOFFM1 - Equal to one if year before layoff year, zero otherwise.    
LOSS  - Equal to one if earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations is less than zero, zero otherwise. 
*All variables are deflated by total assets.       
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LAYOFF is not significant in the direction predicted in the AP model. It is, however, significant in the 
opposite direction. This drop in accounts payable should not be surprising considering the drop in inventory. To 
determine the effect of lower inventory levels, we estimated accounts payable as a function inventory level using 
univariate regression. Results indicate a coefficient of 0.2731 and significance of p≤0.0001. While we find no 
manipulation of accruals associated with accounts payable to decrease reported income, we can also conclude that our 
results in the components measure of accrual models are not driven by accrual of liabilities associated with the layoffs.  
 
The results in the depreciation model are not simple to interpret. While LAYOFF is significant (p≤0.0001) 
using the full sample,
14
 that significance disappears when the sample is reduced to exclude firms with special items. It 
appears that the significant increase in depreciation expense in the event year is reported by firms that report special 
items. LAYOFF was not significant in the direction predicted in the deferred tax expense model. It was, however, 
significant in the opposite direction. To discover the extent to which the increased depreciation expense contributed to 
the decreased deferred tax expense, we estimated deferred tax expense deflated by total assets as a function of deflated 
depreciation expense. Results indicate a coefficient of -0.0347 and a significance of p≤0.0001. Thus, we would expect 
deferred taxes to have the opposite effect in the model as depreciation expense would have. These results using the 
individual components of accruals indicate a decline in accounts receivable and inventory and an increase in 
depreciation expense in the event period, supporting conclusions drawn from the estimates derived from the total 
accruals models. 
 
To better visualize the effect of layoff events on the individual components of accruals, we calculate the 
residuals for each component of accruals by estimating model (6) and substituting the six individual components of 
accruals for total accruals. The residuals are plotted in Figure 2. Notice that both the accounts receivable and inventory 
accruals drop substantially in the layoff year and increase substantially in year +1. Notice also that the depreciation 
accrual in the full sample increases in each of the three years -2, -1, and 0, and decreases in each of the three years +1, 
+2, and +3. These results are expected. Since accounts receivable and inventory accruals are self-reversing in the 
following year, we would expect to see the decline in year zero followed by an increase in the succeeding year. The 
depreciation accrual is not self reversing in the short-term; therefore, increases in depreciation can be made in 
anticipation and have effects that linger longer than current accruals. 
[Please insert figure 2 about here] 
 
Our definition of LAYOFF included the arbitrary cutoff of one percent of the total workforce. We tested the 
sensitivity of our results to this cutoff by repeating estimates of model (5) using other workforce percentages as the 
cutoff. We used cutoffs of two, three, five, ten and twenty percent. Results are similar to those in Tables 3, 4, and 5. 
Several of the statistically significant t-statistics related to LAYOFF decrease slightly when the cutoff is increased. 
Most of these, however, remain significant. Some t-statistics increase. None of our conclusions are changed by the 
results using higher cutoffs.  
 
 We had some difficulty in defining event years for some firms. If announcement of layoffs is made in the first 
few months of a fiscal year, we don’t know if the firm cares more about adjusting the current quarter’s earnings or the 
prior quarter’s (prior year’s) earnings. Tests reported thus far make the announcement year the event year. To adjust 
for the potentially confounding effect of announcements in the first three months of a fiscal year, we deleted all firms 
with significant layoff announcements in the first three months of the fiscal year (reducing the sample to 4,594 firm 
years) and re-estimated models reported in Tables 3 and 4. In cases where LAYOFF and LAYOFFM1 were significant 
as predicted in Tables 3 and 4, t-statistics were generally larger when firms with announcements in the first three 
months were deleted.  
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Figure 2 – Panel A: 
Discretionary Accounts Receivable Accruals 
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Figure 2 – Panel B: 
Discretionary Inventory Accruals 
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Figure 2 – Panel C: 
Discretionary Accounts Payable Accruals 
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Figure 2 – Panel D: 
Discretionary Taxes Payable Accruals 
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Figure 2 – Panel E: 
Discretionary Depreciation Accruals 
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Figure 2 – Panel F: 
Discretionary Deferred Tax Accruals 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This study examines the discretionary accrual behavior of firms that announce large layoffs. The findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis that firms use accruals to decrease reported earnings in periods in which they announce 
large layoffs. We find that in the announcement year discretionary accruals are made to decrease reported income. In 
particular, we find a reduction in accounts receivable and inventory and some indication of an increase in depreciation 
expense. Though our findings are not conclusive, they are suggestive of accrual manipulation surrounding large 
layoffs. While we cannot attribute a single motivation to this manipulation since it is consistent with several theories of 
income management, it remains a significant finding that accruals are being managed in periods surrounding large 
layoffs. Employee groups and other users should be aware that income reports in these periods may be biased 
downward. 
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 The findings of this study suggest that further investigation may be need in fully understanding the 
implications of accounting information released at the same time as large layoffs, and that further investigation of the 
components of total accruals may be fruitful. While the influence of individual components may become lost in an 
investigation of total accruals, further study of unexpected changes in each component may reveal more useful 
information on hoe earnings are actually managed.   
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END NOTES 
 
1
 Christie (1990) and Watts and Zimmerman (1990) review the literature. 
2
 See, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1995), Lambert (1984), and Healy (1985). 
3
 These hypotheses are described by Amir and Livnat (1996), among others. 
4
 Greenberg (1990) summarizes the literature. 
5
 Armstrong-Stassen (1994) in a study of layoff survivors finds that ―how survivors perceive a workforce reduction, 
particularly in terms of their own job security, is a more important determinant of how they cope than the coping 
recourses they have available (p.617).‖ 
6
 When this test is repeated without the adjustment to the Jones (1991) model recommended by Dechow et al. (1995), 
the model F-statistic is slightly higher and t-statistic for LAYOFF is slightly lower. However, these changes are small 
and would not affect any conclusions drawn from the tabulated results. 
7
 We read all entries under the headings of downsizing, layoffs, and unemployment. 
8
 A cutoff was needed to eliminate announcements of layoffs affecting a trivial number of employees. One percent is 
an arbitrary number. Cutoffs of 2%, 3%, 5%, 10%, and 20% yield similar results. 
9
 The requirement that the preceding years have no large layoff announcements is to reduce the possibility that the 
prior-year effect on accruals is contaminated by prior announcement of large layoffs. 
10
 The R
2
 of forty-one percent is considerably higher than the fourteen percent reported by Hall and Stammerjohan 
(1997) and the twenty-three percent reported by Jones (1991) and considerably lower than the sixty-four percent 
reported by Cahan (1992). 
11
 Mean (all amounts in millions) of total assets for our sample is $10,150. Mean net income is $237, resulting in a 
mean return on assets of 0.023. The coefficient on LAYOFF of -0.0083 represents a reduction in reported accruals 
(and thus, income) of 0.83% of total assets, and a 36.1% reduction in ROA (-0.0083/0.023). Return on median assets 
produces similar results. 
12
 Hribar and Collins (2002) used absolute values of $10,000 for their cutoffs. 
13
 To ensure that the significant results for LAYOFF in the accounts receivable model are not driven by our use of the 
modified Jones model estimation of discretionary accruals, we reestimated the accounts receivable components model 
with discretionary accruals measured without subtracting the change in accounts receivable from the change in sales in 
the event years. There is no significant change in results. The results for LAYOFF is slightly weaker in the full sample 
results and a little stronger in the clean NSPI sample.  
14
 There is the possibility that the significant results LAYOFF in the depreciation model are caused by a decline in the 
scalar in the event years and not by an increase in depreciation. We control for that possibility by including the level of 
fixed assets as control variable in the model. In addition, we looked at the mean of total fixed assets in event time. The 
mean of total assets increases in each year. There is almost no increase in assets in the first event year. There is, 
however, no decrease in fixed assets in the event years. Thus, it does not appear that a decrease in total assets accounts 
for the significant results for LAYOFF in the depreciation model.  
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NOTES 
